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Abstract
This paper presents a cross-layer communication protocol for Wireless Sensor
Network (WSN) enabled surveillance system for sensitive fenced areas, e.g., nu-
clear/oil site. Initially, the proposed protocol identifies the boundary nodes of
the deployed WSN to be used as sentinel nodes, i.e., nodes that are always in
active state. The remaining nodes are used as duty-cycled relay nodes dur-
ing the data communication phase. The boundary nodes identification process
and data routing are both performed using an enhanced version of the Greedy
Perimeter Stateless Routing (GPSR) protocol, which relies on a Non Unit Disk
Graph (N-UDG) and referred to as GPSR over Symmetrical Links (GPSR-SL).
Both greedy and perimeter modes of GPSR-SL forward data through symmetri-
cal links only. Moreover, we apply the Mutual Witness (MW) fix to the Gabriel
Graph (GG) planarization, to enable a correct perimeter routing on a N-UDG.
Simulation results show that the proposed protocol achieves higher packet de-
livery ratio by up to 3.63%, energy efficiency and satisfactory latency when
compared to the same protocol based on the original GPSR.
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GPSR, Network Lifetime, Reliable Geographical Routing Protocol
1. Introduction
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) are a class of wireless ad hoc networks.
They consist of a set of battery-powered sensor nodes with limited hardware
resources, i.e., memory, processing, radio range and bandwidth. Nowadays, they
are extensively used in several domains such as military, health, environment,5
transport and agriculture etc. [1, 2, 3]. Their mission is to collect information
from the physical world and to send it, through multihop communication, to a
sink node that is connected to a remote decision system.
Surveillance is an attractive domain in which WSNs are increasingly used.
However, surveillance applications require an energy-efficient and reliable de-10
sign. On one hand, the monitoring scheme should be energy-aware in order
to extend the network lifetime and, therefore, the duration of the surveillance
mission. Indeed, batteries of sensor nodes can not be easily replaced due to the
nature of such mission, which requires discretion and even stealth operation, the
harsh environment in which the network is deployed or the scale of the deploy-15
ment. On the other hand, the routing of the messages, from the source nodes,
where the intrusion is detected towards the sink node, should be performed
reliably to reduce data loss and ensure a high protection of the monitored area.
In this paper, we address the surveillance of sensitive fenced areas, e.g., oil or
nuclear site, using WSNs with asymmetrical links. Asymmetrical links are the20
consequence of radio irregularity phenomenon [4]. It arises from multiple factors,
such as antenna and medium type, and is accentuated by environmental factors
such as obstacles, e.g., buildings, hills or mountains, and weather conditions.
To address the requirements of monitoring sensitive fenced areas, we pro-
pose a duty-cycled WSN protocol that is based on algorithms which rely on25
realistic assumptions about radio and consequently on their resulting Non-Unit
Disk connectivity Graph (N-UDG), to route packets to the sink node. This pro-
tocol first identifies the nodes located on the fence of the sensitive area, called
2
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Sentinel Nodes (SNs), using an algorithm based on a variant of the Greedy
Perimeter Stateless Routing protocol (GPSR) termed GPSR over Symmetrical30
Links(GPSR-SL). SNs are maintained in active state throughout the duration
of the surveillance mission. When an intrusion occurs, the SN that detects
the intrusion generates an Alert Message (AM) and sends it towards the sink
node. To save energy, the remaining network nodes, referred to as Duty-Cycled
Relay Nodes (DC-RNs), are duty-cycled and used as relay nodes during the35
routing process of AMs. The duty cycling is done asynchronously [5, 6] us-
ing a Medium Access Control (MAC) protocol similar to B-MAC [7]. Sec-
ondly, the proposed surveillance protocol ensures a reliable routing process of
AMs by the use of GPSR-SL, which enables reliable geographic routing on a
N-UDG [8, 9, 10, 11]. Indeed, an AM is forwarded through symmetrical links40
only, using greedy, perimeter or a combination of the two routing modes allowed
by GPSR-SL. Moreover, in order to overcome the perimeter routing failure re-
sulting from the failure of the planarization algorithms [12, 13] when they are
executed on a N-UDG, we use the Mutual Witness (MW) fix [12, 14].
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents45
the related work. Section 3 provides the targeted WSN system model and
assumptions of the current study. Section 4 presents an overview of the original
GPSR protocol. Section 5 details the GPSR-SL protocol. Section 6 describes
the proposed surveillance protocol. Section 7 presents the simulation results.
Finally, Section 8 concludes this paper.50
2. Related Work
Energy saving and routing of AMs towards the sink are two key issues in the
design of WSNs-based surveillance systems employed to secure sensitive fenced
areas and international borders. Indeed, given that sensor devices are energy-
constrained, energy conservation ensures the extension of the network lifetime55
and consequently the longevity of the surveillance mission. Furthermore, re-
porting of event detection to the sink must be done reliably to reduce false
3
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positives and true negatives. In this section, survey energy saving mechanisms
and routing protocols used in such systems.
Kim et al. [15] proposed a WSN-based Fence surveillance System (WFS).60
The latter is expanded to connect and control network camera, Unmanned
Ground Vehicles (UGV) and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) in order to im-
prove system accuracy. WFS is organized in three parts, ground and fence sen-
sors, base station and subsystems (UAV and UGV). To achieve energy saving
in the ground/fence WSN, the authors employed a sleep/awake mechanism for65
CPU, RF module and sensor modules. Furthermore, they utilized a hierarchical
routing protocol to report the result of the collaborative detection performed
by ground and fence sensors to the base station. WFS exhibits interesting fea-
tures such as adaptation to dynamic changes of network topology and low power
consumption. However, none of these features was verified experimentally, in70
simulation or test bed.
In [16], Sun et al. introduced BorderSense which is a 3-layered WSN archi-
tecture for border patrol systems (long strip-like monitoring area). It combines
various types of sensors such as UGV/UAV, unattended ground/underground
sensors and camera sensors, to improve the detection accuracy of border patrol75
systems. The main contribution of this paper is to describe a framework to
deploy and operate BorderSense. The authors did not consider means of energy
savings such as sleep/awake cycle or transmission power control to save energy
in ground/underground WSNs. As regards the routing of multimodal data be-
tween the sensors of different layers when suspicious events are detected, they80
outlined communication protocols from literature on the basis of which they
proposed communication solutions to enable a cooperative intrusion detection
between the three layers of BorderSense. These proposed solutions were not
evaluated, performance evaluation of BorderSense was left for future work.
Rothenpieler et al. [17] presented FlegSens which is a surveillance system85
for critical areas, e.g., borders or private properties. The system uses only
simple passive infrared sensors for trespass detection. FlegSens’s major focus
is to ensure integrity and authenticity of AMs in the presence of an attacker
4
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who may even compromise a certain number of sensor nodes in the WSN. To
extend the network lifetime, authors use a duty cycling protocol at the link layer90
to manage the duty cycles of nodes and minimize communications end-to-end
delay. Furthermore, they used a flooding mechanism at the network layer to
communicate detection of a trespasser towards a dedicated gateway. Flooding-
based algorithms are not scalable, energy inefficient and do not ensure reliable
delivery of AM.95
An approach to mitigate the hole problem in WSNs-based surveillance ap-
plications is proposed in [18]. Holes are the result of intentional destruction
of sensor nodes or death due to batteries depletion. Simulation results show
that this sensor redeployment based mitigation approach extends the network
lifetime and keeps its sensing quality above a certain threshold. The effect of100
three main factors on the sensing quality and the network lifetime are studied:
• density of the deployment
• intruder interarrival
• redeployment.
The authors have not considered the effect of asymmetrical links on the sensing105
quality and the network lifetime.
In [19], the performance of Ad hoc On Demand Distance Vector (AODV),
Dynamic Source Routing (DSR) and Optimized Link State Routing (OLSR)
protocols are compared in WSNs-based border surveillance applications. The
comparison is made using delay, traffic load, packet loss, and energy consump-110
tion metrics. Simulation results have shown that DSR performs better than
AODV and OLSR for a network with limited number of nodes. However, one
of the drawbacks of DSR is that it relies on a network connectivity graph with
symmetrical links. In fact, when a node knows a route to the destination, it
sends a unicast Route REPly packet (RREP) to the source node via the reverse115
path of that it has learnt during the Route REQuest (RREQ) packets broadcast
phase.
5
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Bellazreg et al. [20] proposed a border surveillance system based on a hetero-
geneous WSN deployed along the border in the form of a thick line. The authors
described a deployment strategy and a routing technique to ensure a good qual-120
ity of coverage and efficient data exchange. However, the study focused on
coverage and connectivity without giving any attention to energy consumption
or reliability of links.
In [21], Hammoudeh et al. proposed a border-surveillance system based on
Linear WSNs (LWSNs). Their system, based on flat and modular architec-125
ture, comprises a set of Basic Sensor Nodes (BSNs) which collaborate to detect
and report events to a Monitoring Tower (MT) that is connected to a remote
decision center. A cross layer communication protocol, referred to as Levels
Division Graph (LDG), is designed to meet the requirements of LWSNs-based
applications in terms of energy efficiency and end-to-end delay. LDG adjusts130
dynamically BSNs transmission power based on their network level, which is pro-
portional to their distance from the MT, to achieve energy savings. Moreover,
the authors proposed a mechanism of sleep/awake cycle to save more energy
and reduce end-to-end delay. Furthermore, link selection in LDG algorithm is
based on a cost metric which includes residual energy of the parent in the data135
routing tree, distance to reach it and the quality of the link between the two
nodes. The latter is provided by the MAC layer based on the Received Signal
Strength Indicator. The study did not specify how can a BSN reach a MT in
the existence of asymmetrical links.
It is clear from the literature survey that there is no real attempt to address140
the link asymmetry issue, which has a negative impact on the performance
of higher layer protocols. The deployment of WSNs in real environment ne-
cessitates new protocols that take into account this phenomenon to meet the
requirements of WSNs-based surveillance applications including PDR, latency
and energy consumption.145
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Figure 1: Surveillance model based on a Duty-Cycled WSN.
3. Network Model and Assumptions
We consider a static WSN, composed of N sensor nodes and one resource-
rich sink, as depicted in Figure 1. Nodes are deployed uniformly at random to
monitor a fenced sensitive area. We assume that the terrain is not obstacle free.
Each node is aware of its own position, obtained through a Global Positioning150
System (GPS) or a localization approach [22, 23, 24, 25, 26]
The transmission ranges of nodes are irregular due to multiple factors, in-
cluding, antenna and medium type, obstacles and weather conditions. There-
fore, links between nodes may be asymmetrical and voids may be present in the
network. We remind that voids may also exist due initial deployment irregular-155
ities.
In this study, the path loss between two nodes, which is due the distance
between a Transmitter-Receiver (T-R) pair and to the presence of fading factors,
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is predicted using the log-normal shadowing model as defined in [27]:
PL(d) = PL(d0) + 10× n× log10( d
d0
) +Xσ (1)
where PL(d) is the path loss in dB at the T-R distance d in meters, PL(d0) is
the path loss in dB at a reference distance d0 in meters, Xσ is a zero-mean
Gaussian distributed random variable in dB with standard deviation σ in dB,
and n is the path loss exponent. n indicates at which rate the path loss increases
with the T-R distance. Table 1 shows the value of n in different environments.
σ represents the shadowing effect. We note that in this study we do not consider
the temporal variation of the path loss. If Pt is the transmitted power at T-R
distance d, the received power Pr(d) is expressed as follows:
Pr(d)[dBm] = Pt[dBm]− PL(d)[dB] (2)
Table 1: Path loss exponent for different environments [27].
Environment n
Free space 2
Urban area cellular radio 2.7 to 3.5
Shadowed urban cellular radio 3 to 5
In building line-of-sight 1.6 to 1.8
Obstructed in building 4 to 6
Obstructed in factories 2 to 3
The real connectivity graph of the network is noted as G(V,E), where V
represents the set of nodes and E is the set of edges representing connectivity
between nodes. An edge (A,B), i.e., A → B, exists between nodes A and B
if and only if a message sent by A can reach B. We indicate the set of neigh-160
bors of a node u by N (u) and its set of neighbors that belong to its Gabriel
Graph (GG) [28] by Ng(u). A GG is a planar graph, i.e., a graph in which no
two edges cross. It is built from the initial network connectivity graph using
8
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either Algorithm 1 or Algorithm 2. We remind that a packet is forwarded over
a GG, when using the perimeter mode of GPSR-SL protocol.165
The neighborhood discovery stage takes place once sensor nodes have been
initially deployed. Then, the identification phase of SNs starts. At the end
of this phase, the duty cycle1 of DC-RNs (nodes that have not been identified
as SNs) is set to a value less than one and the surveillance process begins.
Thus, when an intruder attempts to cross the network boundary, an AM is170
generated by the SN having detected the intrusion and forwarded towards the
sink through symmetrical links using GPSR-SL. At the access level, we use
an asynchronous contention-based MAC protocol (similar to B-MAC protocol)
with a retransmission mechanism.
4. An Overview of the GPSR Protocol175
u v
w
Figure 2: How to build GG [28]: when the network connectivity graph is modeled using UDG,
the edge uv /∈ GG if there is a witness w in the shaded circle of diameter uv (see Algorithm 1).
The Greedy Perimeter Stateless Routing (GPSR) protocol is a well-known
geographic routing protocol for wireless networks [28]. To forward a packet,
GPSR combines a greedy routing method on the initial UDG and a perimeter
routing. This perimeter routing is called face routing and it runs on a planar
subgraph such as GG, which is built from the initial UDG as shown in Figure 2.180
Using the greedy routing, a node sends a packet to its geographically closest
neighbor to the destination. Greedy forwarding fails when a packet reaches
a node that has no neighbors closer to the destination than itself, due to the
presence of voids in the network. This is known as the local maximum problem.
1duty cycle = activity
activity+sleep
9
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In that case, the packet is routed using the perimeter mode, which forwards185
the packet to its final destination based on the well-known right hand rule [29],
counter-clockwise along the faces of the planar subgraph that intersect with the
line between the source and the final destination. Greedy mode resumes when
the packet reaches a node that is closer to the final destination than the node
that has initiated the perimeter mode.190
Greedy and perimeter routing of GPSR are designed to work on a UDG,
where links between nodes are symmetrical. Therefore, when the connectiv-
ity graph of the WSN is modeled as a N-UDG, they suffer from a number of
problems.
(a) Asymmetrical link due to the
radio irregularity (u can hear v
but not vice versa).
(b) Symmetrical link (u can hear
v and vice versa).
Figure 3: Radio irregularity gives rise to link asymmetry.
When using the greedy mode, the link between the forwarding node and195
the selected next neighbor may be asymmetric due the to the radio irregularity
phenomenon as shown in Figure 3(a). Thus, the forwarding node will never
receive an ACK from that neighbor even if it will try to retransmit the packet.
Therefore, it drops the packet after a certain number of tries. Obviously, this
leads to a waste of energy due to retransmissions, and to a low PDR in the case200
where the packet has been effectively lost. On the other hand, the link between
the forwarding node and the next neighbor may be bidirectional, as depicted
by Figure 3(b), but it may experience a high path loss. In this case, the packet
10
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will be likely lost due to the unreliability of the link or it will be necessary to
retransmit it. This situation leads to reduction in PDR as well as increase in205
energy consumption and end-to-end delay.
As for the perimeter mode, it suffers from the failure of planarization al-
gorithms. It has been shown that in presence of radio irregularity, these algo-
rithms produce a subgraph that is a partitioned planar, planar with asymmet-
ric links or not planar at all in which crossing edges are still present [12, 13].210
These three pathologies lead to the failure of the perimeter routing. To over-
come this routing failure on a N-UDG, several fixes have been proposed such as
Mutual Witness (MW) [12], Cross-Link Detection Protocol (CLDP) [14], Lazy
Cross-link Removal (LCR) [10] and Greedy Distributed Spanning Tree Rout-
ing (GDSTR) [30].215
Algorithm 1 GG algorithm
Require: N (u).
Ensure: Edge (u, v) belongs to Gabriel Graph or not.
1: while v ∈ N (u) do
2: while w ∈ N (u) do
3: if (w = v) then
4: continue {go to next node}
5: else
6: {m is the middle of the segment uv}
7: if (distance(m,w) < distance(m,v)) then
8: Ng(u)← Ng(u)− {v}
9: break {leave the current loop}
10: end if
11: end if
12: end while
13: end while
11
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Algorithm 2 GG algorithm with MW fix
Require: N (u).
Ensure: Edge (u, v) belongs to the Gabriel Graph of the node u or not.
1: while v ∈ N (u) do
2: while w ∈ N (u) do
3: if (w = v) then
4: continue {go to next node}
5: else
6: {m is the middle of the segment uv}
7: if ((w ∈ N (u)) ∧ (w ∈ N (v))) then
8: if (distance(m,w) < distance(m,v)) then
9: Ng(u)← Ng(u)− {v}
10: break {leave the current loop}
11: end if
12: end if
13: end if
14: end while
15: end while
12
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Table 2: The structure of a Hello packet broadcasted by a node NI.
Field Full name
NI Node Identifier
NP Node Position
NS Neighbors Set (all nodes from which it can hear)
Table 3: Neighbor table of a node u.
Field Full name
NGI NeiGhbor Identifier
NGP NeiGhbor Position
SYM 1 if the link (u→ NGI) is symmetrical else 0
STATUS 1 if SN, else 0
5. Description of GPSR-SL Protocol
The Greedy Perimeter Stateless Routing over Symmetrical Links (GPSR-
SL) is a variant of the original GPSR described in Section 4, which is suitable
for N-UDG. The original GPSR has been modified as follows.
Firstly, we have added a link symmetry detection mechanism [31] which al-220
lows each sensor node to identify its symmetrical neighbors. During the neigh-
borhood discovery stage, a node broadcasts its identifier, its position and its
Neighbor Set (SN), i.e., all nodes from which it can hear, as shown by the struc-
ture of a Hello packet in Table 2. On the reception of a Hello packet, a node fills
its neighbor table, as shown in Table 3, and checks whether its own identifier225
belongs to NS included in the Hello packet received. If it is the case, it marks
the link, between itself and the node from which it receives the Hello packet, as
symmetrical (SYM = 1). Otherwise, the link is marked as asymmetrical (SYM
= 0)
Secondly, we have modified the greedy and perimeter modes of the original230
GPSR as described in Sections 5.1 and 5.2 respectively.
5.1. Greedy routing
13
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Algorithm 3 Greedy routing of GPSR-SL.
Require: a packet p, N (u).
Ensure: next hop v if it exists, otherwise returns −1.
1: d← distance(u, p.SP)
2: v ← −1
3: while w ∈ N (u) do
4: if link(u,w) is symmetrical then
5: if distance(w, p.SP) < d then
6: d← distance(w, p.SP))
7: v ← w
8: end if
9: end if
10: end while
11: return v
The greedy mode of the GPSR-SL forwards a packet based on two criteria,
the distance and the link symmetry, as shown in Algorithm 3. The forwarding
node chooses among its neighbors with whom it has a symmetrical link, the235
one that is geographically closest to the sink. Given that each node saves the
coordinates of all its 1-hop neighbors in its neighbor table and the sink coordi-
nates are included in the AM to forward (see Table 4), the forwarding node is
indeed able to identify its geographically closest neighbor to the sink among its
neighbors with which it has a symmetrical link. We remind that link symmetry240
detection is done during the neighborhood stage.
5.2. Perimeter routing
Unlike the greedy routing which is executed on the initial connectivity graph,
the perimeter routing must be executed on a planar subgraph that is built from
the initial graph, by removing crossing edges using planarization algorithms,245
e.g., GG planarization. These algorithms fail to produce a planar subgraph
when the underlying network connectivity graph is a N-UDG [12, 13]. This
14
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Table 4: Header fields of a packet p (NET layer) [28].
Field Full name
PK Packet Kind (AM or BDP)
FM Forwarding Mode (Greedy or Perimeter)
SI Sink Identifier
SP Sink Position
PH Previous Hop Identifier
I-NPF Identifier of the Node where packet entered
Perimeter mode for the First time
P-NPF Position of the node having identifier I-NPF
LFP Position of the point on the line between the source
and destination packet entered current face
FE First Edge traversed on current face
failure gives rise consequently to a perimeter routing failure. Several fixes
have been proposed to overcome the failure of these algorithms, namely Mu-
tual Witness (MW) [12], Cross-Link Detection Protocol (CLDP) [14], Lazy250
Cross-link Removal (LCR) [10] and Greedy Distributed Spanning Tree Rout-
ing (GDSTR) [30]. Among these proposed fixes, we have chosen to implement
the MW fix due to its high message-efficiency [10] and ease of implementation.
We remind that the MW fix applied to GG planarization is not enough to obtain
a “safe” planar subgraph.255
Perimeter routing of GPSR-SL runs on a planar subgraph obtained using
GG planarization algorithm to which we apply the MW fix. The MW states
that a node u eliminates the link (u, v) from the initial graph if there exists
at least one witness, visible both to u and v, in the shaded circle of diame-
ter uv depicted in Figure 2. In our case, this is achieved when nodes broadcast260
their neighboring tables (their NS), during the neighborhood discovery phase
described in section 5, in order to identify the symmetrical links.
Every time a node u has to forward a packet, using the perimeter mode, to
15
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a node v among its neighbors with which it has a symmetrical link, it checks if
the edge (u, v) belongs to its GG or not. If it belongs, the node v it becomes a265
candidate to be the next hop. Then, among all these candidate nodes, the next
hop is chosen using the well-known right hand rule [28]. If the chosen edge (u, v)
intersects with the line between the node where the AM enters the perimeter
mode for the first time and the sink node, GPSR-SL protocol moves to the next
face of the GG and continues the routing of the AM on that face.270
6. GPSR-SL based surveillance protocol
In this section, we present the cross-layer surveillance protocol dedicated
to the surveillance of sensitive fenced areas. Initially, the proposed protocol
identifies the Network Boundary Nodes (NBNs) to be used as SNs during the
surveillance process. Then, it ensures the routing of AMs generated by SNs,275
until the sink.
6.1. Identification of NBNs
When the neighborhood discovery stage ends, the sink node begins the
discovery of NBNs through the creation and sending of a Border Discovery
Packet (BDP) to a Fictitious Destination (FD). The latter is a sensor node280
which is disconnected from all other nodes of the WSN. We remind that the
algorithm of identification of NBNs is inspired by the algorithm described in [32].
As illustrated in Figure 4, the sink projects its 2-D location on the four lines
delimiting the deployment field, i.e., the fences of the monitored area. Then, it
selects the closest point to itself among the obtained four points, to be the FD.285
Secondly, the sink creates a BDP (see Table 4), and sends it towards the FD
using GPSR-SL protocol. Initially, the Forwarding Mode (FM) field of BDP is
set to Greedy. As shown in Algorithm 4, each time the BDP is forwarded using
the perimeter mode, the forwarder node identifies itself as SN and broadcasts
this information to its neighbors. When the BDP returns back to the node where290
it is entered in the Perimeter mode for the First time (NPF), the discovery stage
16
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Algorithm 4 The proposed communication protocol.
Require: a packet p, N (u), Ng(u).
Ensure: the forwarding of a packet p to a next hop v and the identification of
NBNs.
1: if p.FM = “Greedy” then
2: v ← greedy(p)
3: if v = −1 then
4: v ← perimeter(p)
5: end if
6: else {FM = “Perimeter”}
7: if dist(u, p.SP) < dist(p.P-NPF, p.SP) then
8: p.FM ← “Greedy”
9: v ← greedy(p)
10: if v = −1 then
11: v ← perimeter(p)
12: end if
13: else
14: v ← perimeter(p)
15: end if
16: end if
17: if v 6= −1 then
18: forwarding p to v
19: if (p.FM = “Perimeter” and p.PK = “BDP”) then
20: u identifies itself as SN and informs its neighbors.
21: end if
22: else
23: routing failure at node u
24: end if
of SNs stops. In fact, when the BDP returns back to that node (NPF), it is
confirmed that all SNs have been identified, because the FD is disconnected
17
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from all other nodes and therefore the BDP will never reach it. Finally, the
radio of the DC-RNs is duty cycled and the surveillance process is initialized.295
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Figure 4: Network boundary nodes identification.
In the example shown in Figure 4, the sink node greedily sends a BDP to
node 1, which is geographically the closest node to the FD represented with a
gray color. Then, node 1 sends the BDP to its neighbor, node 2, which is the
closest neighbor to the FD. Node 2 has no neighbors closest to the FD than
itself. This node represents a local maximum, in which the BDP enters the300
perimeter mode for the first time.
Node 2, which is also called (NPF), changes the FM of BDP to Perimeter and
forwards it to node 3, using the right hand rule. The BDP makes a complete tour
counter-clockwise until reaching the node where it has entered the perimeter
mode for the first time (NPF), namely node 2. At this moment, we are sure305
that all NBNs have been discovered.
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6.2. Alert Message routing
Upon detecting an intrusion, the SN generates an AM and sends it towards
the sink using a multi-hop routing protocol, as described by the network-layer
Algorithm 4. The next hop is given by GPSR-SL protocol using, either greedy310
or perimeter mode. The greedy mode is executed on the initial network con-
nectivity graph. It attempts to forward the AM, over symmetrical links, to the
neighbor geographically closest to the sink.
As for perimeter mode, it requires a planar subgraph to forward the AM.
In this study, we have used GG planarization algorithm to which we apply315
the MW fix (see Algorithm 2), to build a planar subgraph of the underlying
initial network connectivity graph. We remind that the MW states that a
node u eliminates the link (u, v) from the initial graph if there exists at least
one witness, visible both to u and v, in the shaded circle of diameter uv depicted
in Figure 2. The forwarding of the AM is done over the GG subgraph obtained,320
using the perimeter mode of GPSR-SL described in Section 5.2.
Receiver time
(SN) AM
Sender time
(SN) AM
(a) Communication between SNs
(DC-RN)
(DC-RN)
listen
sleep
listen
sleep
listen
listen
sleep
listen
sleep
listen
AM
AM
short preambleSender time
Receiver time
(b) Communication between DC-RNs
listen
sleep
listen
sleep
listen
AM
AMShort preamble
Sender time
Receiver time
(SN)
(DC-RN)
(c) Communication between SN and DC-RN
listen
sleep
listen
sleep
listen
AM
AM
Receiver time
(SN)
Sender time
(DC-RN)
(d) Communication between DC-RN and SN
Figure 5: Communication between two nodes at the access level (MAC layer) according to
the status of the receiver node.
At the access level, the AM is sent using an asynchronous contention based
MAC protocol (similar to B-MAC [7]). The communication between two nodes
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Figure 6: Illustration of the cross-layer design used.
is done based on the status of the destination node (SN or DC-RN) as depicted
in Figure 5. In fact, if the receiver is a DC-RN, the sender transmits a series325
of short preambles, lasting as long as the sleep period of the receiver before
sending the AM as shown in Figure 5(b) and Figure 5(c). However, in the case
where the destination is a SN, the sender saves energy by transmitting the AM
directly, since SN is always in active state; this is illustrated in Figure 5(a) and
Figure 5(d).330
The information about the status of the receiver is obtained by the MAC
layer of the sender through a cross layer design which enables an interaction
between the network and the MAC layers as shown in Figure 6. We recall
that when a node identifies itself as SN during the NBNs identification stage,
it broadcasts its status to its neighbors which store this information in their335
neighbor table (at the network layer).
7. Performance Evaluation
The performance of the presented surveillance protocol is evaluated through
simulation under the Castalia simulator [33], which is based on the OMNeT++
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platform [34]. We use three metrics, namely energy consumption, PDR and340
end-to-end delay to compare the performance of our GPSR-SL surveillance pro-
tocol with the GPSR surveillance protocol. We note that the interference man-
agement model implemented in Castalia simulator have been used in order to
manage collisions in the network. The interference model is based on the Signal
to Interference plus Noise Ratio (SINR) metric. In fact, when a sensor node345
receives several signals sent by multiple sources or due to the multi-path phe-
nomenon, it accepts the one with the higher SINR. All results are averaged over
100 runs of 120 second simulated time each. We note that we vary the network
topology during each simulation run, by varying the path loss between nodes,
while the number and positions of the nodes remain unchanged. We remind350
that the path loss between two nodes is predicted using Equation (1) given in
Section 3. Its variation is obtained by the variation of the shadowing effect rep-
resented by the zero-mean Gaussian distributed random variable with standard
deviation σ, Xσ. Table 5 summarizes the most important parameters of the
simulation.355
7.1. Performance metrics
• Energy: Is the overall energy consumed during the simulation duration,
computed according to the energy model provided by the Castalia simu-
lator.
• PDR: Represents the ratio of the number of packets received by the sink360
to the number of packets generated by source nodes.
• Average End-to-end delay: Is the average elapsed time between the time
of sending an alert by a source node and the time of arrival of this alert
to the sink.
7.2. Results analysis365
7.2.1. Effect of varying the length of the duty cycle
Figure 7 highlights the PDR according to the variation of the duty cycle
length. Results show that the proposed surveillance protocol achieves higher
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Table 5: Simulation parameters.
Parameter Value
Simulation time 120 seconds
Terrain (not obstacle free) 90 m × 90 m
Number of nodes 150
Network Topology per 100 (at each simulation run, the number and positions
simulation run of the nodes are kept constant while
the path loss between nodes varies)
Average number of NBNs 44
Average number of Alert 4.69, 9.19, 15.98
Messages (AMs) sent
Deployment Random
Number of sinks 1 (always in active state)
Battery capacity 18720 Joules
Propagation model Log-normal shadowing
n 2.4
σ 4.0 dB
Radio CC2420
Data rate 250 kbps
Radio sensitivity −95 dBm
TX power 0 dBm
Power consumption TX: 57.42 milliWatt
RX: 62 milliWatt
Network Layer GPSR-SL, GPSR
MAC Layer Tunable MAC (B-MAC like protocol)
Listen period 10 milliseconds
Number of retransmissions 0
Duty Cycle of SNs 1
Duty Cycle of DC-RNs Ranging from 0.1 to 1.0 by step of 0.1
Interference management Enabled
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Figure 7: PDR according to the duty cycle (average number of AMs over the 100 simulations
= 4.69, deployment area = 90m× 90m, total number of nodes = 150).
PDR when compared to the original GPSR. The PDR is improved under the
different duty cycle lengths considered. The improvement is 1.32% on average.370
It reaches 3.63% when all the nodes of the network are maintained in active state.
The high PDR allowed by the proposed protocol is the direct consequence of
the use of reliable links, i.e., symmetrical links to forward the AMs. It is also
due to the use of the MW fix, which enhances the performance of the perimeter
routing on a N-UDG.375
Figure 8 shows PDR plots with error bars, corresponding respectively to
GPSR and GPSR-SL. We note that we have used a 99.73% confidence interval,
i.e., 99.73% of simulation values fall within three standard deviations of the
mean (3*σ).
Figure 9 shows that GPSR-SL achieves energy conservation when compared380
to GPSR. Indeed, despite the fact that the PDR achieved by GPSR-SL is higher
than that of the GPSR, the total energy consumption in the network when us-
ing GPSR-SL is almost the same than that resulting from the use of GPSR.
The main reason is that GPSR-SL forwards AMs through symmetrical links,
which are more reliable than asymmetrical links used by original GPSR. The385
waste of energy resulting from the use of GPSR is mainly due to the fact that
packets are lost when they are forwarded through asymmetrical links. This re-
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Figure 8: PDR with error bars according to the duty cycle (average number of AMs over the
100 simulations = 4.69, deployment area = 90m x 90m, total number of nodes = 150)
sult shows that GPSR-SL is able to achieve the same PDR as GPSR at lower
energy expenditure. This makes GPSR-SL more suitable for long-term surveil-
lance applications, which require low energy consumption in order to extend the390
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Figure 9: Total energy consumed according to the duty cycle (average number of AMs over
the 100 simulations = 4.69, deployment area = 90m× 90m, total number of nodes = 150).
network lifetime and operate reliably.
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Figure 10: Average End-to-end delay according to the duty cycle, (average number of AMs
over the 100 simulations = 4.69, deployment area = 90m×90m, total number of nodes = 150).
Figure 10 shows the average end-to-end delay generated by the two studied
protocols. It is observed in the figure that GPSR-SL achieves a reasonable
average end-to-end delay under the different duty cycle, compared to GPSR.
The slight difference (∈ [0.96 ms, 30.99 ms]) is due to the fact that the link395
between the forwarding node and the node geographically closest to the sink
is generally not symmetrical. Therefore, the shortest path will not always be
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chosen by GPSR-SL leading to an increase in the hops traveled by an AM to
reach the sink.
7.2.2. Effect of increasing of the number of AMs400
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Figure 11: PDR according to the number of AMs, deployment area = 90m × 90m, total
number of nodes = 150).
As depicted in Figure 11, the PDR achieved by GPSR and GPSR-SL de-
creases under the different duty cycle lengths considered, when the number of
AMs increases. This is due to the interference resulting from the increase of con-
current transmissions. However, GPSR-SL achieves a higher PDR than GPSR,
since AMs are forwarded through symmetrical links which are more resilient to405
interference. This is a very interesting result since in surveillance applications,
it is common for several intruders to cross the secured area at the same time (see
Figure 1) from different places. Thus, several AMs will be generated and sent
simultaneously towards the sink. In this case, our surveillance protocol based
on GPSR-SL will be able to forward more AMs to the sink. This is of prime410
importance in the process of monitoring of a sensitive area since it allows the
remote decision system to react to a maximum number of AMs.
Figures 12 and 13, represent respectively the results of the two other metrics
considered in this study. As can be seen in Figure 12, the total energy consumed
in the network, when using either GPSR or GPSR-SL, is almost the same. This415
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Figure 12: Total energy consumed according to the number of AMs, deployment area =
90m× 90m, total number of nodes = 150).
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Figure 13: End-to-end delay according to the number of AMs, deployment area = 90m×90m,
total number of nodes = 150).
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Figure 14: Simulation results of the three considered metrics, according to the path loss
exponent (deployment area = 90m × 90m, total number of nodes = 150, duty cycle = 0.7
(70%), average number of AMs over the 100 simulations = 4.69).
confirms our analysis of energy consumption in Section 7.2.1. The end-to-end
delay for both protocols increases also since nodes will increasingly (when AMs
increase, as depicted in Figure 13) delay their transmissions due to interference
created by the simultaneous transmissions. We notice that as can be seen in
Figure 13, GPSR-SL achieves a reasonable end-to-end delay, compared to its420
rival GPSR.
7.2.3. Effect of varying the path loss exponent
Figure 14 (a) highlights the PDR according to the variation of the path loss
exponent (n). The results show that GPSR SL achieves a higher PDR when
compared to the original GPSR. Figures 14(b) and 14(c) show respectively the425
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effectiveness of GPSR-SL in terms of energy consumption and latency when it is
compared to GPSR. Indeed, our proposed protocol enables energy efficiency and
satisfactory latency. For example, for n = 2.7 the PDRGPSR SL= 18.34%, the
energy consumed is 1166.53571 Joules and the latency is 103.40 milliseconds,
while PDRGPSR=13.86%, the energy consumed is 1166.53528 Joules and the430
latency is 89.8 milliseconds.
7.2.4. Effect increasing of the network density
Table 6: PDR achieved by GPSR SL according to the duty cycle and number of sensor nodes.
Duty Cycle PDR(GPSR SL(150)) PDR(GPSR L(250))
0.7 (70%) 20.90% 20.67%
1.0 (100%) 38.17% 36.81%
As shown in Table 6, the increase of the number of sensor nodes leads to the
decrease of PDR achieved by GPSR SL, for the two considered values of the duty
cycle (0.7 (70%)) and (1.0 (100%)). This can be explained as follows. When435
the network becomes dense, nodes are closer to each other and consequently
links are more reliable. In such case, GPSR SL maximizes the average hop
count traversed by an AM. Indeed, GPSR SL will choose short symmetrical
links. Therefore the risk of collision and interference increases. The solution is
to forward the AMs based on the trade-off between hop count and the quality440
of links (symmetrical links with the lowest path loss) in order to further reduce
packet loss and retransmissions.
Table 7: PDR achieved by GPSR according to the duty cycle and number of sensor nodes.
Duty Cycle PDR(GPSR(150)) PDR(GPSR(250))
0.7 (70%) 19.19% 18.29%
1.0 (100%) 34.54% 34.92%
As for GPSR (See Table 7), the variation is likely due to the increase of the
node degree, i.e., N(u) becomes more important and therefore a node u has
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much more candidate neighbors for the next hop. The new candidates for the445
next hop may be a factor of increase or decrease of PDR. We remind that the
increase of the number of sensor nodes has no significant impact on the average
hop count generated by GPSR since it continues to select the long distance links
regardless of the node density (favors neighbors closer to the destination).
8. Conclusion and Future Work450
This paper presents a surveillance cross-layer protocol for monitoring sen-
sitive fenced areas under realistic terrain constraints, such as obstacles, and
other unpredictable fading factors, e.g., interference, which lead to the radio
irregularity phenomenon. The key point of the proposed GPSR-SL surveillance
protocol is that it is based on algorithms, which take into account radio irreg-455
ularities, by modeling the WSN connectivity-graph as a N-UDG. Experimental
evaluation demonstrates the effectiveness of GPSR-SL in terms of PDR, energy
consumption and end-to-end delay when it is compared to its rival GPSR. In-
deed, the results show that the proposed protocols enables a high PDR without
increasing energy consumption and while maintaining application-acceptable460
end-to-end delay compared to GPSR.
As an extension of the current work, we plan to make the NBNs identification
algorithm robust against NBNs failures. We also plan to forward the AMs
based on the trade-off between hop count and the quality of links (symmetrical
links with the lowest path loss) in order to further reduce packet loss and re-465
transmission rate. Another possible extension, to enhance both the PDR and the
algorithm used for the identification of the network boundary nodes; this can be
achieved through the enhancement of the performance of the perimeter mode
of GPSR-SL by implementing other more efficient fixes of the planarization
algorithms. Finally, we plan to secure the forwarding process of an AM towards470
the sink and the protocol robustness against malicious attacks such as jamming.
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